Legislative Acts

Congress Reform Facts

This page uses a Q&A format to clarify disputes around congressional reform, including legislative procedure, voting methods, concerns about expanded powers, and the Constitutional Court judgment. Readers can start with the questions, then consult the passed text, motion documents, and related news as needed.

🧑🏻‍💻 No time to read? No problem! There’s an AI assistant at the bottom right corner. Click on it to chat directly with the ‘Congress Reform Facts’ page to learn more!

Q&A

Q: It sounds like the draft for the congressional reforms was publicly known, but amendments were introduced on the voting day. How much time was there between the final version being distributed to everyone and the actual voting?

A: According to Legislative Procedure Rule 11, amendments can be made during the second reading discussions or during the third reading, and they require the endorsement of at least ten members to be valid.

In this instance, the Kuomintang (KMT) submitted their amendments at 7 AM on May 17th. The staff then printed and distributed these amendments to all 113 legislators present. This procedure is both compliant and legal. Similarly, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) also submitted their amendments on the same morning at 7 AM. The voting results, including our approval, are in line with process adherence.

Amendments are typically filed on the spot and thus can’t be immediately published online. This has been the standard practice for all parties involved. Nonetheless, all legislative staff and members present have access to printed copies during voting, and post-vote there are review reports and meeting records usually available by the next midday working hour.

From my perspective, having more time and faster online publication could definitely be an improvement worthy of discussion. However, such changes would likely require amendments to legislative rules and might involve procedural defenses. If any party believes the rules should be revised for earlier and more transparent publishing of amendments, it would be a reasonable discussion point. However, critiquing a specific party under the current rules seems inappropriate.

Q: Was there sufficient discussion?

A: The Judicial and Legal Affairs Committee conducted several public hearings and special reports on 3/21, 4/3, 4/10, and 4/11, including one detailed session on 4/15 that lasted over 10 hours. However, due to over 40 motions to adjourn and extended debates on minor details, no conclusive discussions were reached, and the matter was referred to party negotiations.

Negotiations among the three main parties took place on 5/8, but no consensus was reached (all parties were involved), which then led to the second reading in the House.

For context, during the 2016-2020 ninth session, out of 635 cases with no consensus during negotiations, 558 cases (87.87%) were still passed by majority vote during the third reading.

I can’t definitively claim what constitutes “sufficient” discussion, but to say there was no discussion or transparency seems exaggerated. In a democracy, there can always be more discussions, and I support that. But how do we define “sufficient”?

Q: Was the legislation made public?

A: In conclusion, the integrated version coordinated by KMT and the People’s Party is a complete document, not a draft, and I have uploaded it to the IPFS system:

https://peach-imperial-cuckoo-83.mypinata.cloud/ipfs/QmT3AAFpvBe26hcXDpPys7Ar4FEqf6n599JvHwbaGnmYnb

According to Legislative Procedure Rule 11, amendments can be proposed during the second or third readings and require at least ten co-signatures to be valid.

The KMT submitted their amendments at 7 AM, and the amendments were printed and distributed to all legislators present, fully compliant and legal. Such amendments, filed on the spot, were not meant to be published online immediately, a practice consistent across all parties. However, legislative staff and everyone present at the session had access to printed copies during the vote, and post-session there are review reports and meeting records available.

As for online publication, legislative staff typically upload documents to the website by midday the next working day. I agree that quicker digitization is possible, but the staff are already doing their best—please offer them some encouragement!

This session (5/17) addressed five major parliamentary reform bills proposed by the KMT and the People’s Party, including strengthening personnel confirmation rights, Legislative Yuan investigative rights, regular National Reports to the President, Contempt of Congress laws, and named voting for the Speaker and Deputy Speaker. These reforms entail multiple existing law amendments, involving various proposals from different parties, which after extensive coordination, resulted in a joint version. This joint version was submitted before the session, and the DPP’s amendments were also submitted early morning on the same day. There were no issues with transparency regarding the law texts.

Q: Does the Congressional Reform Bill address criminal penalties for individuals, corporations, and enterprises?

A: The proposed Article 47 of the “Act Governing the Exercise of Legislative Powers” extends to relevant entities, but it only includes fines and not criminal penalties.

This seems reasonable for now. In the U.S. Congress, companies or individuals called to testify cannot lie, as this constitutes perjury, a federal crime subject to significant legal penalties, including fines and imprisonment for up to 5 years.

Furthermore, Congress can initiate criminal perjury charges and refer cases to the Department of Justice for prosecution. Honest testimony is crucial for congressional investigations, and violations can severely impact the legal system and governmental operations.

Article 59-1 concerns criminal law but has not yet been voted on and primarily addresses leaking confidential information, a matter likely to have bipartisan support.

Q: Why use the outdated method of “raising hands for votes” when there are voting machines on the desks?

A: The Legislative Procedure Rule 35 explicitly states:

Voting methods include:

• Oral voting,

• Raising hands for voting,

• Voting machines,

• Ballot voting,

• Roll call voting.

• The method to be used from the first to fourth options is to be decided by the Chairman’s announcement.

While the KMT supports the use of voting machines, repeated violent disruptions and threats to the safety of the Chair and staff by the DPP have made it necessary to resort to raising hands for a voting process to avoid further incidents.

Q: Why were the provisions not read out individually before voting?

Provisions were indeed read out individually.

Meeting times for the reading were:

• 18:51:22 for Article 2,
• 20:43:28 for Article 15,
• 21:05:35 for Article 15-1,
• 21:48:54 for Article 15-2,
• 22:09:08 for Article 15-4,
• 22:59:15 for Article 17,
• 23:20:05 for Article 22,
• 23:45:27 for Article 23.

Available for viewing at: https://ivod.ly.gov.tw/Play/Full/1M/15925

Q: Are the Parliamentary Reform Five Laws an overreach or unconstitutional?

Yes, they expand powers →

However, which party holds the majority in Congress is decided every four years, making any long-term benefits politically neutral.

Within Taiwan’s system, aside from the Legislative Yuan, the only other checking body is the Control Yuan. If the Control Yuan, led by Chen Chu, fails to perform its duties, who else can oversee the government?

Not unconstitutional →

The KMT’s proposed reform is essentially the same as laws proposed by the DPP back in 2014.

President Tsai Ing-wen’s 2016 campaign included establishing a hearing and investigation system as part of her reform promises; she and other DPP members like Lai Ching-te have historically supported regular National Reports and investigative hearings.

For further reference, see Tsai’s 2015 congress reform agenda: https://www.facebook.com/share/3Fuvfbp1j2udFmtX

The recommendation for local councilors’ name voting, supported during Lai Ching-te’s tenure, proposed extending this to the national level: https://www.cna.com.tw/news/firstnews/201811090230.aspx

Q: The National Federation of Attorneys released a statement criticizing the 5/17 congressional procedures. Your thoughts?

A: The current head of the National Federation of Attorneys, Yu Mei-nu, is a former DPP legislator. The decision to issue the statement lacked transparent representation, and the present Lawyers Act utilizes compulsory membership which puts into question the extent of representation.

Yu Mei-nu and other DPP members involved in past boycotts had also proposed expanding congressional investigative powers, specifically:

• Including specific procedures for interaction with Congress, allowing for a robust application of legislative oversight, not constrained by confidentiality clauses.

Mandatory membership in the local bar association (like the Taipei Bar Association with around 7,000 members) led to controversy with several members disassociating from the statements made, indicating that this statement might only reflect certain political biases.

Q: So did the legislators know what they were voting on during the session?

A: (Referencing https://www.thenewslens.com/article/202861)

“On the day of the vote, every member had the amended motions on their desks. Each legislator saw these amendments unless there was intentional avoidance of discussion. The DPP, instead of discussing, started disruptive behavior and rhetoric about democracy and loyalty, avoiding substantial debate.

Regarding the awareness of the legislative content, while reading out the laws before voting, it’s expected that non-legislators would hear this despite the disorderly conduct during the session.

In essence, even if the text remains unchanged, the content of other acts might not raise concern as representatives are trusted to manage these reviews. Any outrageous final texts submitted by a party will face electoral consequences, making each legislator accountable.”

Related Resources

Passed Third Reading Provisions of the Act Governing the Exercise of Legislative Powers

Below are the articles of the Act Governing the Exercise of Legislative Powers passed on third reading at the plenary session on May 28, 2024.

Compiled by the Legislator’s Office; please refer to the official Legislative Yuan Gazette for authoritative legal texts.

• Article 2 Legislators shall report on February 1 and September 1 of each year, with the opening date decided through party caucus negotiations. In the event of presidential dissolution, new members shall report on the third day after election results are gazetted, with the session opening on the tenth day. Reporting and session attendance shall be conducted in person. If caucus negotiations cannot reach a consensus on the opening date, the Speaker shall convene a meeting of all legislators to vote on the agenda draft submitted by each caucus.
• Article 15 When an emergency decree issued by the President under Article 2, Paragraph 3 of the Additional Articles of the Constitution is submitted for ratification, it shall be referred to the Committee of the Whole for review without debate, and then submitted to the plenary for a roll-call vote. If not approved, the emergency decree becomes null and void immediately. If the decree is issued during recess, a special session shall be convened immediately. If issued after dissolution, a special session shall be convened within three days and decided within seven days; if issued after an election, new legislators shall handle it after taking office.
• Article 15-1 In accordance with Article 4, Paragraph 3 of the Additional Articles of the Constitution, the Legislative Yuan shall invite the President to deliver a State of the Nation address during its annual sessions. The President shall submit the report before February 1 and deliver the address before March 1. A newly elected President shall submit the report within two weeks of inauguration and deliver the address within one month.
• Article 15-2 Upon proposal by at least one-fourth of all legislators and resolution of the plenary, the Procedure Committee may schedule an agenda to hear a State of the Nation address on major national policies and key issues. The President may also request approval from the Legislative Yuan to deliver an address on major policies within presidential authority.
• Article 15-4 After the President’s address, legislators may raise oral or written questions on unclear points. The President shall answer oral questions sequentially and in real time; speaking time, order, and party quotas shall be determined by caucus negotiations. Written questions shall be answered in writing within seven days, extendable by five days for complex matters.
• Article 22 Oral interpellations shall be answered by the Premier or designated ministers; unanswered portions shall be answered in writing within ten days, extendable by five days.
• Article 23 Interpellations under constitutional authority shall be listed in the agenda and forwarded to the Executive Yuan, which shall respond in writing within fifteen days, extendable by ten days for complex matters.
• Article 25 Responses to interpellations shall not exceed the scope of inquiry and shall not involve counter-questioning. Interpellated officials may not refuse to answer, refuse to provide materials, conceal information, make false statements, or commit other acts of contempt of congress, except with the Chair’s consent to prevent immediate danger to national defense or diplomacy or for lawful confidential matters. Officials may not be absent without permission. Violations may incur fines of NT$20,000 to NT$200,000 upon proposal by the Chair or five legislators and plenary resolution, subject to administrative litigation. False statements may lead to impeachment, discipline, or criminal prosecution.
• Article 26 The Premier, Vice Premier, and heads of ministries shall attend plenary sessions in person. In their absence with approved leave, non-political deputy heads may not take the rostrum to answer questions, but may provide materials for the Premier to answer.
• Article 28 Interpellations on budget preparation reports shall be registered on the first day, with a 15-minute question-and-answer format.
• Article 29 Consent votes under constitutional provisions shall be referred to the Committee of the Whole for review and passed with approval from more than half of all legislators by roll-call vote. Statutory consent cases shall be reviewed by relevant committees and passed similarly. The review period shall not be less than one month and must include public hearings with scholars, civic groups, and impartial experts.
• Article 29-1 Nominees’ educational background, degrees, theses, career history, property, tax, and criminal records shall be submitted within seven days of nomination. Nominees must submit written answers and affidavits affirming truthfulness under penalty of law.
• Article 30 & 30-1 The Committee of the Whole or relevant committees shall review nominees separately. Nominees must make an affidavit before testifying. Refusing to answer, refusing to provide materials, or providing false statements may result in refusal to review and fines of NT$20,000 to NT$200,000.
• Article 31 & 44 Results of consent votes shall be officially communicated. If rejected, the President or Premier shall nominate another candidate. Impeachment against the President/Vice President requires a two-thirds majority of all legislators to refer the case to the Constitutional Court.

Chapter VIII: Exercise of Investigative Powers

• Articles 45–46-2 The Legislative Yuan may establish Investigation Committees by plenary resolution or Investigation Task Forces by committee resolution. Committees may request materials and hold hearings. Investigation powers must not exceed stated purposes and must respect the constitutional independence of other branches and executive privilege regarding confidential decisions. Ongoing judicial or administrative appeal cases shall not be investigated.
• Articles 47–48 Investigation bodies may require government agencies, military units, legal entities, or relevant individuals to provide documents within five days or appear to testify. Public officials who refuse or delay may be referred to the Control Yuan. Non-governmental entities or individuals who refuse or delay may be fined NT$10,000 to NT$100,000, repeatable until compliance.
• Articles 49–53-3 Staffing, confidentiality obligations, witness protection, voluntary legal counsel assistance, and conflict-of-interest rules are established. Evidence must be handled under strict confidentiality rules.

Chapter IX-1: Holding of Hearings

• Articles 59-1–59-9 Committees may hold public hearings on bills, consent cases, or impeachment. Hearings may be closed for state secrets, privacy, life safety, or trade secrets. Invited persons may not refuse without justifiable reasons and may be accompanied by legal counsel or assistants with the Chair’s consent. Refusal to testify or provide data without justification may incur fines of NT$10,000 to NT$100,000. Government officials making false statements face impeachment, disciplinary action, and criminal prosecution; relevant individuals making false statements face fines of NT$20,000 to NT$200,000. Hearing records and reports shall be compiled and published in the gazette.
• Article 74-1 Bills directly proceeding to the second reading shall be referred to party negotiations convened by the proposing legislator or caucus.

Key Highlights of Constitutional Court Judgment 2024 Hsien-P’an-Tzu No. 9

The following is an AI-assisted summary of the Constitutional Court judgment regarding constitutional questions in the amended Act Governing the Exercise of Legislative Powers.

• Constitutional Judgment 2024 No. 9
• Constitutional Court Judgment 2024 No. 9 Summary

The Constitutional Court judgment (2024 Hsien-P’an-Tzu No. 9) clarified the separation of powers and the protection of individual constitutional rights, ruling several provisions unconstitutional or imposing strict constitutional limits on their application.

Separation of Powers

The Court ruled that the Legislative Yuan’s expansion of power into executive prerogatives—particularly regarding the President and the Executive Yuan—violated constitutional boundaries. For example, the legislature cannot constitutionally mandate the President to report within specific timeframes or answer specific inquiries in person.

Protection of Individual Rights

The Court held that certain investigation powers excessively infringed upon personal privacy and freedom of speech. Investigative powers must be subject to rigorous procedural safeguards and judicial remedy to protect individual basic rights.

Key Ruling Summaries on Specific Provisions

• Presidential State of the Nation Address: Mandatory requirements regarding presentation formats, timelines, and real-time Q&A were declared unconstitutional as an infringement on presidential constitutional standing.
• Interpellation and Counter-Questioning: Provisions prohibiting counter-questioning remain constitutional only when interpreted as maintaining orderly inquiry rather than restricting necessary clarification by executive officials.
• Criminal Contempt of Congress: The newly added criminal contempt provisions targeting executive officials were declared unconstitutional for exceeding the legislature’s supervisory scope and placing undue legal pressure on officials.
• Investigation Powers: Investigation committees may operate, but their authority over private citizens and non-governmental entities must respect procedural due process, privacy, trade secrets, and the privilege against self-incrimination.
• Legislative Hearings: Attendees may refuse to testify based on legitimate rights such as privacy and legal privilege; mandatory attendance penalties for private individuals were strictly limited or invalidated.
• Personnel Consent: The legislature has authority to review nominees, but information demands and penalties must not paralyze constitutional appointments or infringe upon nominees’ privacy rights.

Procedural Defects

While the Court noted procedural flaws in the legislative process (including inadequate debate and transparency in voting methods), it ruled that these procedural defects did not reach the threshold of rendering the entire legislative enactment procedurally void.

Significance of the Judgment

• Reaffirming Separation of Powers: Clarified constitutional limits between legislative oversight and executive administration.
• Safeguarding Civil Liberties: Set constitutional guardrails against unrestricted parliamentary subpoenas and privacy intrusions.
• Rule of Law Guidance: Established clear legal boundaries for future institutional reforms and inter-branch coordination.