Legislative Acts

Multi-Satellite Regulatory Adaptation

Multi-satellite regulatory adaptation aims to open Taiwan’s sky and build a diverse communications network of submarine cables, microwave links, and satellites. The goal is not to open the door for only one provider, but to give Taiwan more resilience options for disaster response, rural access, aviation, maritime communication, and national security.

Latest Legislative Progress

The Legislative Yuan passed the amendments to Articles 36 and 95 of the Telecommunications Management Act, advanced by Legislator Ju-Chun Ko and other lawmakers, on third reading on July 21, 2026. The new framework removes outdated foreign-ownership and chairperson-nationality barriers for public telecommunications networks using satellite technology. Regulators may approve applications case by case after reviewing national security, public telecommunications network security, spectrum use, overall network planning, industry development, and market development.

The cross-party reform is not tailored to one company and does not grant automatic approval to any operator. It replaces rigid formal restrictions with substantive, accountable review. International satellite services already used in Ukraine, the United States, Japan, South Korea, and elsewhere now have a legal pathway into Taiwan, but each provider must still pass regulatory review and comply with safeguards for data localization and direct-to-phone satellite services.

Two Attached Resolutions

The draft left the Transportation Committee together with two attached resolutions. Both make clear that opening satellite communications must proceed with complete security, oversight, and public-interest safeguards:

1. Satellite ground gateways and data localization: Because Article 36 would substantially relax restrictions on foreign investment in Taiwan’s telecommunications market, the competent authority should require satellite ground receiving stations and data to be located in Taiwan as necessary conditions. This is intended to protect regulatory oversight, national-security review, cybersecurity rules, data governance, lawful communications monitoring, and disaster-response and emergency communications mechanisms.
2. Safeguards for direct-to-phone and direct-to-device satellite services: Direct-to-phone and direct-to-device satellite services affect the replacement of mobile communications, transmission of users’ communications and location data, cross-border network governance, communications monitoring, cybersecurity management, and fair market competition. Before the relevant policy and legal framework is complete, the competent authority should consult industry, government, academia, and other stakeholders and establish the necessary rules and supporting measures.

Third Reading Is Only the First Step: From Throttling Drills to Backup Switching

On the day the amendments passed, a newspaper front page reported that the government was planning a mobile-network throttling drill. Drills can be appropriate, but intentionally reducing service without clearly switching to backups, maintaining service, and verifying outcomes does not demonstrate that Taiwan can stay connected during war, disasters, or submarine cable outages.

Legislator Ko argues that true communications resilience is not practicing how to disconnect people, but ensuring uninterrupted access to information. He will continue pressing the government to integrate satellites, submarine cables, microwave links, and terrestrial networks into backup systems that can be switched and tested in practice, turning legal reform into reliable connectivity for rural communities, offshore islands, disasters, and emergencies. For his full position on the 2026 mobile-network throttling drill and the five questions he has raised, see Mobile Network Throttling Drill.

A New Era of Satellite Communications

In February 2022, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the systematic destruction of terrestrial telecommunications infrastructure, SpaceX’s Starlink low-earth-orbit (LEO) satellite constellation was rapidly deployed, providing uninterrupted connectivity for Ukrainian military and civilian operations. The conflict proved to the world that LEO satellites are no longer just commercial services, but critical infrastructure for national survival.

The LEO Satellite Revolution

Traditional geostationary (GEO) satellites (such as ST-2, which Taiwan currently relies upon) orbit at an altitude of 36,000 km. While offering broad coverage, they suffer from high latency, limited bandwidth, and scarce unit counts that make rapid replacement after damage virtually impossible.

Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellites operate at altitudes between 500 and 2,000 km, offering three distinct advantages:

1. Low Latency: Signal round-trip time drops from ~500 ms to ~20 ms, supporting real-time voice, video, and mission-critical applications.
2. High Bandwidth: Individual satellites can deliver throughput of multiple gigabits per second.
3. High Resilience: Constellations consisting of hundreds or thousands of satellites ensure overall network continuity even if individual satellites fail.

Direct-to-Cell Technology: Eliminating Blind Spots

Technological evolution has advanced further. In 2024, Japanese telecom operator KDDI launched Starlink Direct-to-Cell service, enabling standard smartphones to connect directly to satellites without specialized hardware. In remote mountains, maritime zones, or post-disaster areas where traditional cell towers collapse, connectivity remains available wherever there is an open sky.

Taiwan’s Critical Vulnerability: A 90% Single-Point-of-Failure Risk

Surrounded by sea, Taiwan appears naturally protected, but in the digital era, this geographical reality creates significant vulnerability.

Over-Reliance on Submarine Cables

Over 90% of Taiwan’s international data traffic travels via undersea cables, with landings concentrated in a few locations such as Tamsui, Toucheng, and Fangshan. While high-capacity and cost-effective, submarine cables remain highly vulnerable to:

• Natural Disasters: Earthquakes and underwater landslides (such as the 2006 Hengchun earthquake).
• Human Accidents: Fishing trawlers and anchor drags.
• Military Threats: Deliberate sabotage via submarines or unmanned underwater vehicles, creating an immediate “information island.”

Insufficient Backup Capacity

Taiwan’s current satellite redundancy relies primarily on the joint Singapore-Taiwan ST-2 geostationary satellite and limited bandwidth contracted from the UK’s OneWeb LEO constellation. ST-2’s commercial governance leaves priority access uncertain during crises, while OneWeb’s coverage capacity remains far from sufficient to replace undersea fiber.

Regulatory Deadlock: The Article 36 Barrier

Prior to recent amendments, Article 36 of the Telecommunications Management Act prohibited foreign ownership exceeding 49% and required the chairperson to be a ROC national. Designed in the 1970s under Cold War telecommunications frameworks, this restriction effectively locked out international operators such as Starlink and Amazon Kuiper from establishing licensed local presence.

Domestic Satellite Constellations Need Time

While the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) plans to launch Taiwan’s first domestically made LEO communications satellite by 2027 under the B5G project, building a full constellation requires hundreds of satellites and years of development. Autonomous R&D must be complemented by immediate international partnerships.

Legislator Ju-Chun Ko’s Reform Proposals

Faced with a major national communications gap, Legislator Ju-Chun Ko has advocated pragmatic regulatory adjustments to improve Taiwan’s communication resilience.

Option 1: Amend Article 36 of the Telecommunications Management Act

He proposes reviewing antiquated restrictions—such as foreign ownership limits and nationality requirements for company chairpersons—to allow international satellite operators to set up local subsidiaries under Taiwan’s oversight. This would not remove national security protections, but instead introduce smarter guardrails:

• Require data to land in Taiwan’s ground gateway stations (Gateways) so traffic can be monitored and routed as needed
• Apply domestic encryption layers for critical infrastructure (government, military, financial systems)
• Establish priority-use rules and failover mechanisms during emergency conditions

Option 2: Project-Permit (Special-Case) Mechanism

Before the amendment passed, Ko also proposed a Japan-like project-permit system as an interim option: grant administrative approvals on a case-by-case basis for vetted international LEO services. With Article 36 now passed on third reading, its statutory case-by-case review mechanism will provide the legal foundation. The interim proposal’s intended benefits were:

• Quick deployment without lengthy legislative procedures
• Retain case-by-case government review and oversight
• Accumulate real-world evidence for broader legal reform

The May 12, 2026 general inquiry made this path more concrete: regulators could approve foreign satellite communication providers after confirming that they do not harm national security or other public interests, allowing them to provide satellite communication services in Taiwan without being blocked by certain legacy restrictions. This shifts the question from rigid formal barriers to substantive review based on national security, public interest, and actual risk.

Option 3: Let Multiple International Services Coexist

Ko emphasized that Taiwan does not need only one LEO satellite service. It needs a diverse sky. Starlink, OneWeb, Amazon Kuiper, and other international satellite operators should all have a fair opportunity under the same safety review and public-interest standards. The more diverse the services, the less likely Taiwan is to face a single point of failure during war, disasters, or submarine cable incidents.

Build a Hybrid ‘Cable + Microwave + Satellite’ Network

True resilience comes from diversity. Legislator Ju-Chun Ko advocates a layered design:

• Normal times: Submarine cables as the primary backbone for cost-efficiency and high bandwidth
• Cable outages: Activate microwave links (e.g., between outer islands and the main island)
• Extreme scenarios: Deploy LEO satellite backups to guarantee continuity of government command-and-control and basic public communications

This hybrid strategy ensures Taiwan can stay connected under all circumstances.

Future Vision: Always-Online Taiwan

Legal and responsible satellite adoption yields benefits far beyond national-security backups.

Lifeline for Disaster Response

When earthquakes, typhoons, or other disasters destroy ground infrastructure, satellites become a critical lifeline for rescue teams, medical services, and affected civilians, vastly improving the efficiency of emergency response.

Digital Equity

LEO satellites can solve long-standing coverage issues in Taiwan’s mountains, islands, and rural areas. With direct-to-phone satellite services, hikers, fishermen, and remote communities would gain access to emergency services—achieving genuine digital equality.

Industrial Opportunity

Opening Taiwan to satellite competition will stimulate demand for antennas, ground gateways, and terminals—helping local telecom and hardware industries to move from manufacturing to system-level vendors in the global LEO supply chain.

Always Online

Resilient, multi-layered connectivity ensures that Taiwan’s command chain, financial systems, and basic communications remain online during war, natural disasters, or undersea cable failures—delivering true national continuity.

Call to Action: The sky is open; regulations should not be self-restricted. Support legislative amendments to allow diverse satellites and make Taiwan’s communication network unbreakable and more resilient!

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