KMT 1220 Amendment Facts Section

This page uses ChatGPT for translation, which may result in some discrepancies in names. For the most accurate information, please refer to the original Chinese version.

Join us in supporting the three major bills that benefit the nation and its people! Let's improve local infrastructures, reduce social hatred, and enhance judicial soundness! Reject the Democratic Progressive Party's political maneuvers and inconsistent policies!

I. Overall:

(1) Rumors:

(2) Facts

Amendment to the Fiscal Coordination Law, allowing each county and city to improve livelihoods according to their needs!

The Fiscal Coordination Law had not been amended for 25 years, leaving local governments unable to bridge financial gaps, which hindered local development. Both ruling and opposition parties have proposed visions for amendments, but this time the Kuomintang has succeeded! This amendment avoids past central-local imbalances and genuinely prevents "centralization of funds and power," enabling local governments to have adequate budgets for development.

Amendment to the Election and Recall Law, requiring identity verification for recall endorsements to prevent fraud!

With Taiwan's lowered recall threshold, unlike more advanced democracies, Taiwan has long been plagued by malicious recalls that intensify social hatred. The public could no longer tolerate such tactics. This amendment sets an endorsement threshold to prevent falsification, thus preventing recalls from becoming political tools for malicious struggles.

Amendment to the Constitutional Litigation Law, raising the threshold to two-thirds to avoid abuse and biased judgments!

Previous constitutional court decisions frequently led to social controversies, with widespread public doubts about abolishing the death penalty. This amendment ensures the constitutional court can reach broader consensus, avoiding biased rulings, and truly protecting democratic systems.

Are the three major bills "for the green, not for you"?

We urge the DPP government not to change its stance. Why aren't the previously agreed-upon laws being amended?

II. Amendment to the Election and Recall Law:

1. Taiwan's low recall threshold has turned it into a tool manipulated by the DPP! Comparison with recall thresholds in major democratic countries globally:

• 🇯🇵 Japan
  • Proposal threshold: 30% of the total voters in the district support the proposal.
  • Passing threshold: More votes in favor of recall than against, with a total voter turnout of 50% or more.
• 🇺🇸 United States
  • Proposal threshold: Determined by state laws, generally requires 12% to 25% of the total voters in the district to support by signing.
  • Passing threshold: More votes in favor of recall than against to pass.
• 🇩🇪 Germany
  • Proposal threshold: Determined by regional laws, requiring 5% to 20% of eligible voters to propose.
  • Passing threshold: Recall requires 30% to 50% approval from total eligible voters.
• 🇹🇼 Taiwan
  • Proposal threshold: Proposers must be over 1% of eligible voters, endorsers over 10%, all required to attach photocopies of their national ID's front and back.
  • Passing threshold: More votes in favor than against, and approval votes reaching over 25% of the total eligible voters in the original electoral district.

The DPP claims, "Recalls from Wu Yu-sheng to Han Kuo-yu and Hsieh Kuo-liang were initiated by the public, with few errors in endorsing. However, those against the green camp are initiated by the blue camp."

1. However! What the DPP describes as "public" initiation was in reality led by pro-green NGOs such as "Green Friends," with many organizers found related to DPP officials! The entire public remembers how DPP Secretary-General Lin Yu-chang represented abusing recalls, maliciously recalling Keelung Mayor Hsieh Kuo-liang! The DPP should stop masquerading public opinion and fostering social hatred!

The DPP claims, "The Central Election Commission can already remove false endorsements, and adding ID copies will only inconvenience endorsers without any help in preventing fraud."

1. Providing ID copies can directly enhance the Central Election Commission's capability to remove false and erroneous endorsements; why does the DPP choose to complicate matters?
2. Those genuinely wanting to endorse a recall won't fear inconvenience!
3. Endorsing for presidency and applying for credit cards already require ID photocopies, often submitted to private companies; is it so worrying to submit to the Central Election Commission? Shouldn't government cybersecurity be reviewed first?
4. To prevent the DPP from blaming the Kuomintang for fraud, we now proactively require ID copies for recalls, regardless of whom it recalls. Shouldn't the DPP support this more?
5. Huang Jie describes the amendment as "crippling people's fundamental civil rights" and says "democracy is dying." Were Wu Ping-rui and Fan Yun, who proposed amending the law two years ago, also trying to kill democracy? Does Huang Jie want to shield false endorsements? Is scanning an ID really the "hardest thing ever" for Legislator Huang Jie?

The DPP claims, "Recalls necessitating higher votes than election votes would create 'cage recalls,' where a single-item vote significantly lacks voting motivation, equivalently stripping away the chance for a recall."

1. The Kuomintang's version doesn't change the original 25% threshold, and if approved recall votes are less than the initial election votes, it violates the democratic principle of equal voting. Previously, Legislators Kuo Kuo-wen, Lai Rui-long, and former Legislator Tang Hui-jen believed in 2022 that recall approval should exceed the initial votes of the recalled. Now the DPP opposes its past position, essentially contradicting itself. Besides, the current sentiment is a recall fatigue; the DPP should return from its errant path and consider social stability and development instead of continuing to provoke division and foster "malicious recalls"!
2. DPP caucus leader Ke Jianming bluntly said, "Passing the Election and Recall Law means no recalls," leading "Taiwan's democracy step by step toward demise!" Such scare tactics seem aimed at furthering hate and deepening social tensions. Were Wu Szu-yao and Chuang Jui-hsiung, who endorsed two years ago, also leading Taiwan's democracy to its death?
3. Unlike more advanced democracies, Taiwan is long troubled by malicious recalls, escalating social hatred where public sentiment is intolerant of malicious recalls! This amendment prevents endorsement fraud, preventing recalls from becoming tools for political struggles.

III. Amendment to the Constitutional Litigation Law:

1. Past constitutional court decisions often led to social disputes, with recurring doubts about the abolition of death penalty judges. This amendment ensures broader consensus in the constitutional court, preventing biased judgments and truly safeguarding democratic systems.
2. The DPP claims, "Although foreign nations specify a fixed number of constitutional judges, their compositions differ from Taiwan's; some require no congressional approval (like France), fixing judge numbers would stall proposals, severely impacting people's rights."
   1. Is the violation threshold too high? The fact is Taiwan's new violation threshold is more lenient than Germany's specific vote, stricter than general votes; consistent with the Czech Republic; and more lenient than South Korea.
   2. Germany has 16 constitutional court judges, split into two courts, needing over half (5 judges) for a decision; Japan's Supreme Court has 9 judges, requiring the same; USA's Supreme Court also has 9 judges, needing over half for decisions; democratic countries like the USA, Japan, and Germany always decide by majority, never disputing "a few deciding major constitutional issues" requiring law amendments.
3. The DPP claims, "Abolishing capital punishment is a false issue! Interpretation No. 113, Verdict 8 has declared the death penalty constitutional, not revisiting its constitutionality soon." → But Interpretation No. 113, Verdict 8 adds many unattainable standards to capital punishment, essentially abolishing it, entirely bypassing any judicial possibility of pronouncing death penalties!
4. The DPP claims, "Interpretations 632 (2007/8/15), 113 Verdict 9 mention the Legislature's duty in reviewing personnel consent rights; delaying or deliberately disagreeing would deplete judge numbers, paralyzing constitutional agencies." → But Interpretation 632's "constitutional agency loyalty obligation" presupposes mutual respect among institutions. Today, proposed judge candidates require public scrutiny; how does exercising legitimate consent rights and supervising the executive equate to "deliberately disagreeing"?
5. Additional: Lawyer Chien Chien-jung stated, "Before fearing decisions by a few judges, a contingency preventing the court's suspension due to insufficient number should be considered before discussing stopping decisions by few." → This is essentially circular logic! A few partisan judges would indeed make decisions not reflecting public opinion. How can it require the Legislature to agree they assume office to later consider avoiding absurd decisions? Seeing a pit ahead, must citizens fall first before seeking means of rescue?

IV. Amendment to the Fiscal Coordination Law:

1. Why is the DPP now unwilling to amend the Fiscal Coordination Law it once championed? The DPP might abandon its promises to voters, but the Kuomintang remembers them and strives to make the amendment a reality.

   1. In 2011 and 2012, then-Tainan Mayor William Lai repeatedly stated: "The central government should expedite the three readings of the Fiscal Coordination Law!" Otherwise, "it is difficult to cook without rice." In 2012, Lai also mentioned: "If the president can't solve this issue, I believe Taiwan cannot progress. Any responsible president shouldn't ignore laws concerning the development of special municipalities and keep talking nonsense all the time, I find it inappropriate." In 2017, as Premier, Lai also supported: "We hope the Executive Yuan can propose a draft this year for discussion with the Legislative Yuan, enabling local governments to have more funds available for use."
   2. In 2012, then-DPP Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen noted: "Especially the Fiscal Coordination Law is a very important issue for Taiwan at this stage; we also hope that the Legislative Yuan can expedite its process."
   3. In 2011, then-DPP spokesperson Chen Chi-mai remarked: "The central government's proposal to amend the Fiscal Coordination Law to release only NT$98.2 billion is too little, insufficient to improve the financial difficulties of local governments."
   4. In 2012, then-DPP Chairperson Su Tseng-chang declared: "The Fiscal Coordination Law must be amended!" and "Its revision is crucial for the proper functioning of every local government."
   5. Ke Chien-ming once said: "The Fiscal Coordination Law is perpetually the DPP caucus's top legislative priority."
   6. Pan Meng-an stated: "Previously, the law based allocations solely on population, but counties need funds for maintenance, hence it shouldn’t consider population alone; it should incorporate land area for redeployment."
   7. Lin Chia-lung commented: "Taiwan now has six special municipalities, many of which need more central resources for transportation, water conservancy, and environmental infrastructure."
   8. Cheng Wen-tsan also said: "I agree with the amendment; the current allocation of financial resources is overly centralized."
   9. Su Chih-fen remarked: "If the Fiscal Coordination Law doesn't change, then the central and local governments will resemble a monarch-subject relationship."

2. The DPP claims, "We're not proposing a version now because the current version is the best"?

   1. The KMT version proposes a practical and achievable amendment based on five major criteria: population indicator, business turnover, land area, property tax efforts, and non-tax revenue efforts; the DPP prefers to self-deceive by calling the current version the best, contradicting President William Lai, caucus whip Ke Chien-ming, and all the county and city leaders who previously demanded revisions. DPP's failure to propose any version is essentially legislative negligence, only wanting to obstruct violently and be salary thieves without meeting.

3. The DPP says, "Passing the Fiscal Coordination Law will affect central government subsidies to local governments"?

   1. The fact is, under the KMT’s version: "Existing subsidies that are statutory or established policy budgets will not be cut", "disaster relief efforts remain unaffected", "local construction will be more efficient rather than delayed", and "central major constructions won't be impacted with at least NT$900 billion still available for national major constructions and urgent needs!"
   2. The "Fiscal Coordination Law" only regulates the proportional distribution of central and local budgets, without involving cuts to specific project budgets, which is the responsibility of the executive branch, not Congress. The ruling party should not use coordinated allocation funds to threaten the opposition and local governments; it should address the long-term impacts of "accumulating power and money centrally" on local development by adjusting the allocation ratio through the "Fiscal Coordination Law" to achieve local self-governance.
   3. Reducing the central government's budget allocation ratio won't affect all statutory budgets, nor can it legally cut existing statutory budgets. As for the waste induced by bonus-like policies or erroneous ones such as solar and wind energy, the administrative department should conduct a comprehensive review through the "Fiscal Coordination Law" revision and report to Congress.
   4. With the 2024 general budget in mind, this revised version increases by NT$336.1 billion, far less than this year's NT$510 billion of surplus, so central policies remain unaffected. Previously, the Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics claimed that under the KMT's NT$577.7 billion version, the central government would only have NT$650 billion left after deducting statutory expenses. With the now-passed version, the central government still has at least NT$900 billion available, so why prioritize sacrificing social welfare and child-rearing allowances?

4. The DPP says, "Local fiscal discipline varies, and the budget requirements haven't even been calculated in detail; more ridiculously, we aren't even sure which budgets need movement, nor do we understand which budgets will be affected without a decentralization of authority. Many local governments actually have surplus budgets."?

   1. Amending the Fiscal Coordination Law will not only not affect major constructions but also make local projects more efficient!
   2. Does the urgency of altering distribution depend solely on the DPP's discretion? Indeed, under DPP governance, certain municipalities, regardless of size, amazingly receive more central subsidies. Is it fair to use central funds for specific county constructions to enhance specific county leaders' political performance?

5. The DPP claims, "After the amendment passes, local finances will swell without adequate utilization, resulting in fiscal ruin and debt for future generations"?

   1. Which head of a DPP-governed county or city doesn't support the amendment? Doesn't anyone wish to have more funds for local development? Please say it out loud.
   2. The DPP not only wants central authority but intends to confiscate local autonomy too? On what grounds can they claim that local governments "cannot manage funds properly"? "There is something wrong only if the DPP says so." Priority policies in different areas are different; the current all-central decision-making on whether "necessary" under a "paternalistic" ideology is long out of date!

6. The DPP says, "The amendment will cause insufficient funds for elderly care subsidies, child-rearing allowances, childcare subsidies, and rental subsidies"?

   1. The central government is truly "overflowing with wealth"! In fact, the head of the Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting, and Statistics has admitted that the central government has had budget surpluses in recent years, with approximately NT$250 billion to NT$500 billion unspent annually. The central fiscal situation is robust, with the national tax overcollection exceeding NT$1.8 trillion over the past eight years and an additional NT$2.5 trillion drafted for special budgets. As of November this year, the total national tax collection was NT$3.57 trillion, with local tax revenues being only NT$341.1 billion, accounting for less than 10%. Even including centrally allocated tax funds, local government total tax revenue was only NT$800.7 billion, accounting for 22%, while the central government held 78%. With the central tax revenue proportion high and growth rate significant, it has the fiscal ability to share resources with locals. Financial planning will be in place since the Fiscal Coordination Law will be implemented in 2026. Meanwhile, the Lai administration’s desire for centralized power and money ignores the NT$510 billion exceeding expectation this year—unspent and not allocated to localities, clearly showing a reluctance to support local developments.

   2. Please stop misrepresenting other policies and emotionally blackmailing the public! According to the central government's 2025 budget proposal tax estimation, the KMT version releases an additional NT$375.3 billion of centrally allocated tax funds to local governments, which can be used for public childcare, sewage construction, traffic alleviation, educational spending, urban renewal and land expropriation, police and firefighter expenses, stadium construction, cultural activities, promotion of social housing construction, and advancing local civil defense measures.

   3. The currently passed version of the Fiscal Coordination Law emphasizes that general subsidies will not decrease. Yet the DPP consistently highlights that its passing would drastically cut subsidies; if the central government massively reduced planned subsidies, the Fiscal Coordination Law's impact on central finance would fall below NT$300 billion, dwarfed by the NT$510 billion overcollection. According to the Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics’ explanation: After the revision, the central government finance will decrease by NT$375.3 billion annually, but "statutory spending obligations" of NT$1.8144 trillion cannot be cut, including personnel, social benefits, and education subsidies that are legally unaffected.

   4. Recent years have shown severe overcollection of taxes, with three consecutive years totaling NT$1.34 trillion, and this year alone approaching NT$510 billion, evidencing the central government's chronic administrative malfunction, a necessity to reassess vote-buying policies; the central government isn’t short on funds, just poor in "managing and utilizing funds". Since the DPP does not comprehend allocation and utilization of tax revenue effectively, let the KMT manage it in the future:

      • Defense budget: Like the Raytheon scandal, excessive allocations shouldn’t continue.
      • Labor insurance subsidy: Annually subsidizing NT$120 billion without reform is unreasonable.
      • Low birth rate response: More budget, yet declining birth rates, rendering the policy ineffective and in need of review.
      • Rental subsidies and social housing plans: Subsidies elevate housing prices, social housing construction progresses slowly, yielding uninspired results.

7. The DPP argues, "Changing the Fiscal Coordination Law will affect the central government's disaster relief capability"?

   

   1. Disaster relief is nationwide and indivisible, non-partisan, with no central-local distinction. The last three years’ tax overcollections total NT$1.34 trillion, this year's revision alone adds NT$510 billion. If NT$375.3 billion is released to local governments for their discretion, does the treasury suddenly dwell in emptiness? The ruling party still holds NT$2.7-2.8 trillion immense funds tightly. Disaster relief concerns human safety, and no one at any level of government dares to casually allocate, move, or fail to budget it. Asserting that releasing NT$375.3 billion through the Fiscal Coordination Law affects the central government’s disaster relief ability is completely a scare tactic and abdication of responsibility.
   2. Every cent in government funds comes from the people's hard work; it's not the DPP's private property nor the premier’s pocket money, so how can they claim that amendments mean the central government cannot assist in disaster relief? Or display an indifference to intervene? Is it incompetence, a lack of intention, or total apathy within those in power? Does the DPP still have the people's welfare and safety, and a modicum of empathy for their hardship? Or rather, do they seek to punish the public owing to the opposition’s vigorous amendment advocacy, being many times more malicious than emotional blackmail and willfulness?

8. Increasing the population weight benefits northern urban population centers under this amendment, decreasing rural resources? → The population weight was not increased. Previous population weight for the six special municipalities was 20%, and for counties and cities 55.25%. This amendment unifies the formula to 45% for population weight across both.

9. Is there consideration to integrate industry structure into net zero burden—Kao-hsiung bears 20% of Taiwan's electricity generation, is there potential for additional allocation of financial resources? → Amendments to the Fiscal Coordination Law should not incorporate the net zero burden of industry structure; government energy transition policies are unrealistic, renewable energy goals unattainable, and wind power inefficacy reflects budget waste and resultant scandals. Local budgets should not bear the cost for flawed central energy policies, such as Kao-hsiung and Taichung operating the world’s largest fossil fuel power plants due to policy, complicating future compensation issues. Furthermore, many countries at COP28 have pledged to expand nuclear power generation; should the government follow such trends and extend or restart nuclear facilities to replace fossil fuels, Congress might consider incorporating this into the Fiscal Coordination Law indicators, compensating New Taipei, Kao-hsiung, and proximity counties.

10. Lienchiang County’s population is just over ten thousand, lesser than many regions in Taiwan, yet its allocation surged tenfold from NT$600 million—how do they spend this? According to simulations provided by the Ministry of Finance (based on the 2025 general budget), Lienchiang County’s allocation increased from NT$700 million to NT$2.6 billion, a 3.5-fold increase, not tenfold—this is misinformation!

11. Additional Information:

    1. Amendment to the Fiscal Coordination Law Holds Epoch-Making Significance (opens in a new tab) - Editorial from United Daily News

V. Additional Points:

No Discussion, No Democracy?

→ The fact is: During the DPP's absolute majority period in the ninth Legislative Yuan, bills "passed without consensus but completed third readings" soared to "87.87%" from the "6.19%" under the previous KMT majority! If the DPP continues this double standard, their score is unquestionably 87.

Table 5: Correlation of Consultation Results and Completion of Third Reading (as a percentage of all consultation proposals)

Consultation Results	No Consensus (%)	Consensus (%)	Total (%)
8th Session Unread	606 (93.81)	8 (1.03)	614 (43.27)
8th Session Read	40 (6.19)	765 (98.97)	805 (56.73)
8th Session Total	646 (100)	773 (100)	1,419 (100)
9th Session Unread	77 (12.13)	12 (1.79)	89 (6.81)
9th Session Read	558 (87.87)	660 (98.21)	1,218 (93.19)
9th Session Total	635 (100)	672 (100)	1,307 (100)

Note: Percentages in parentheses.

Sources: Data for the 8th session obtained from Sheng Hsiang-yuan, Huang Shi-hao (2017:56), data for the 9th session self-collated by the original author from the "Legislative Yuan Proceedings and Speech System"

Fiscal Reallocation Calculations Before and After the KMT Caucus's Revised Motion Version

Financial Allocation Calculation for the KMT Caucus's Renewed Motion Version Before and After Amendment:

Key Proposal Points

1. Direct apportionment:

• Inheritance and gift tax: Maintain current system
• Tobacco and alcohol tax: Maintain current system
• Land value increment tax: Counties and cities 80% → 100%

2. Central coordination:

• Income tax: 10% → 11%
• Business tax: 40% → 100%
• Commodity tax: Maintain current system
• Land value increment tax: Counties and cities 20% → 0%

Note: Business tax must deduct 1.5% collection fees and uniform invoice prizes first.

Distribution of ordinary centrally allocated tax funds:

1. 90.5% and 2.5% allocated to cities and counties on the main and offshore islands according to the following weights:

• 30% allocated based on the indicator of business turnover
• 10% allocated based on property tax growth rate scoring
• 5% allocated based on the ratio of non-tax revenue to self-financed resources
• 10% allocated based on land area
• 45% allocated based on population indicator (90% by population count, 10% by income capability)

2. 2% allocated proportionately to special municipalities
3. 5% allocated to townships (urban townships, towns, and cities)

Additional released funds: NT$375.3 billion (based on the 2025 tax revenue budget proposal)

December 20, 2023, Unit: NT$100 million; %

Regions	Current Allocation	Post-Amendment	Change Amount	Change (%)
Total	4,676	8,429	3,753	80.3
Total Muni	2,866	4,585	1,719	60.0
Taipei City	697	1,113	416	59.8
New Taipei City	543	917	374	68.9
Taichung City	446	708	262	58.8
Tainan City	322	485	163	50.4
Kaohsiung City	500	745	245	49.0
Taoyuan City	358	617	259	72.4
Total Cities	1,150	3,105	1,956	170.1
Yilan County	62	190	128	204.5
Hsinchu County	68	253	185	270.2
Miaoli County	81	217	137	169.1
Changhua County	150	331	181	121.0
Nantou County	91	230	138	151.2
Yunlin County	109	258	149	137.2
Chiayi County	81	201	120	147.2
Pingtung County	123	257	134	109.0
Taitung County	62	196	134	216.2
Hualien County	71	232	161	228.2
Penghu County	33	82	49	147.8
Keelung City	58	133	75	128.8
Hsinchu City	83	293	210	253.3
Chiayi City	42	111	69	162.7
Kinmen County	28	88	61	220.9
Lienchiang County	7	33	26	358.4
Townships	382	403	21	5.4
Special Tax	278	336	57	20.6

Note: The current allocation amount in this table does not include the supplementary of the shortage subsidy from FY 2022 and FY 2023 financial tax for FY 2025.

Analysis Opinions

1. The central government increases released funds by NT$375.3 billion, with centrally allocated tax reaching NT$842.9 billion, also clearly defining that post-amendment local general subsidies cannot be less than the previous fiscal year's budgeted amount, in addition to planned subsidies, potentially exceeding the central financial capacity.

2. Distribution formulas primarily based on population indicators may lead to significantly higher allocations for regions with larger populations, benefiting larger municipalities and counties urban counties over other same-level counties and cities (such as New Taipei City’s allocation increased by NT$37.4 billion, Changhua by NT$18.1 billion), disadvantaging less-populated local governments. Furthermore, the business turnover indicator's high weight leads to dramatic increases in allocations for economically developed municipalities and counties (like Taipei City receiving an additional NT$41.6 billion, Hsinchu City NT$21 billion, topping respective categories), further widening fiscal disparities among special municipalities (e.g., Taipei’s allotment differing from Tainan by NT$62.8 billion).

Information vs. Misinformation by Legislator Ju Chun-ko, and Posts

• 3.2.1.1.2.3 - Parliamentary Blockade? (opens in a new tab)
• https://www.threads.net/@dr.juchunko/post/DDzqSXiTvlR (opens in a new tab)